Armenian Georgian Relations

by Simba Sun Mar 02, 2014 7:56 am

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In recent history, Armenians and Georgians have been on opposite sides of the fence, politically and sociologically. The primary problem with Georgia is that the nation is not homogeneous, they have many distinct ethnicities living within its borders, with Turkic tribes being most prominent amongst them.

The multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-faith national reality has always been a problem for the Georgians because they have not been able to formulate a cohesive national character, one that is a representative of all peoples who live within Georgia. Moreover, unlike Armenians, Georgians tend to hate and distrust Russians for various reasons. Furthermore, Georgians have deep rooted historic animosities against Armenians as well. Armenians have always been baffled by this because Armenians have contributed greatly to Georgian culture.

The "Bagratuni" Georgian kingdom that rose to prominence within the thirteenth century A.D. by defeating numerous Turkic armies was of Armenian decent and its military leadership and troop strength was comprised of many Armenians. Armenian Christian monks evangelized Georgian tribes and, thereafter, administered their church for several centuries. Armenians founded or directly influenced the national script of Georgians and also heavily influenced their national architecture. Many prominent Georgians, including their present president, are of Armenian decent. The Armenian population of Tbilisi, during the nineteenth century outnumbered Georgians, exceeding fifty percent.

Despite the above, Georgians have portrayed hostile attitudes towards Armenians. Within the late ninetieth and early twentieth centuries, at a time when Armenians were desperately struggling against Turks for their survival, Georgians often allied themselves with Turks against Armenians. The Georgian military even attacked northern Armenia in 1918, but was defeated by Armenian troops under the leadership of Drastamat Kanayan. Even today, the volatile situation within Armenian populated region of Javakhq is a blaring example of how explosive Georgian-Armenian relations are.

Consequently, there is not much respect towards Georgian politics and society on the behalf of nationalist Armenians. What's more, with strong Turkic, American and J-e-w-ish influences within Georgia today, I do not see Georgians looking favorably toward Russians within the foreseeable future. Armenia has always been Russia's only natural ally within the southern Caucasus. Recent history can corroborate my statement.

Most Armenians, including myself, don't have any problems with the Georgian people or its national culture. Our problems with them is their constant pro-Turkish policies and their ongoing betrayal of their neighbor to their south. Moreover, my biggest disappointment in Armeno-Georgian relations is that although Armenians and Georgians have great potential in working together within the Caucasus, due to Georgia's intimate involvement with Washington, Tel Aviv, and Ankara - this potential has not been realized.

by Simba Sun Mar 02, 2014 8:01 am

The Georgia's blatant aggression against Armenia in 1918 is rarely discussed within Armenian society today. Note that the aggression came at a time when Armenia was barely alive, struggling to get on its feet. They, as a nation, are a bunch of filthy cowards on par with Turks, if not worst. I look forward to the day when the Armenian Republic will number Javakhq and Batumi as its districts.

THE ARMENIAN-GEORGIAN WAR OF 41918

Armenian-Georgian relations figure hardly at all in public discussion. Yet in their enduringly fraught character they have been and to this day remain important to the fashioning of Armenian nationhood and are also significant for the future stability of the Armenian state and the region as a whole. Varik Virapian's `The Armenian-Georgian War of 1918' (250pp, Yerevan, 2003) provides therefore a valuable introduction to the subject starting from the war that exploded between the two states immediately upon their formation in that same year.

As with Armenian-Azeri and Armenian-Turkish relations, disputes over territory were a main cause for the hostilities between Armenia and Georgia with the latter laying claim to regions such as Lori and Akhalkalak both of which were populated overwhelmingly by Armenians. Georgian ambition to annex these territories flouted pre-independence agreements made by the major nationalist forces in the Caucuses - the Armenians, Georgians and Azerbaijanis - to mark out new state borders in accord with demographic facts and the wishes of the majority populations inhabiting disputed territory. Georgia had its reasons for disregarding such agreements.

Besides seeking an expansion of territory Georgian ambitions were driven by another equally important domestic consideration. Historically the Georgian elite had rallied its forces against Armenian economic supremacy in Georgia. Following independence it seized the opportunity to destroy bastions of Armenian power, resorting to whatever means it could. In this enterprise the Georgian state had every interest in weakening its Armenian neighbour that it regarded not only as a contestant over territory, but as a possible defender of Armenian elites in Georgia and a contender in the struggle for hegemony over the Caucuses.

In the looming war the Georgian state had a decided advantage. The ruling Menshevik Party provided it with an experienced and well-oiled political machine that received critical support from German imperialism that had made of Georgia a semi-colony. Here it is perhaps worth noting that though all post 1918 territorial disputes in the Caucuses were generated by the clash of locally rooted nationalist forces, these were exacerbated by European powers who acted the role of chess players manipulating and moving their chosen regional allies in accord with these allies' intrinsic powers but to a design of their own ambitions.

Throughout the disputed regions and Georgia as a whole, the Georgian authorities moved fast to secure advantageous positions. They systematically tightened the political and military noose round Armenian populated regions. They set deadlines for the removal of Armenian national organisations from Tbilisi and demanded the immediate disarmament of Armenian military contingents that were based on what they regarded as their sovereign territory. Simultaneously they launched a political and economic assault on all Armenians in Georgia - with raids on Armenian properties, confiscations of goods,
unprecedented tax levies and other arbitrary demands. In Lori and Akhalkalak Georgian forces having disarmed local Armenian units began to plunder the population, confiscating crops, foodstuffs and property. Thus was set the basis for the Armenian-Georgian war of 1918.

Armenia was ill equipped to wage war. Virapian's quotes from many founders of the Armenian republic pointing to the new state's economic and social dislocation and its political and military isolation, surrounded as it was by two other hostile neighbours, Turkey and Azerbaijan who also had appetite for territory populated by Armenians. Reminiscent of Armenian politics today, Armenian disadvantage was compounded by the refusal of Diaspora capital and its educated elite to come to its assistance. Armenian military operations were further hindered by lack of political and military centralisation, huge logistical and communication problems and increasing indecision by the Armenian government as well as by hostile Turkish and British manipulation.

Armenian-Georgian tensions finally exploded into open war in December of 1918. Full-scale military clashes followed attempts by Georgian forces to repress an Armenian uprising in Lori protesting against Georgian misrule and abuse. Taking the form of a popular peoples' war, Armenian forces initially registered significant gains particularly under the leadership of General Dro. Rapidly however their fortunes dipped. Armenian positions were undermined by Georgian control of sea, road and rail routes essential for Armenian supplies and reinforcements. Georgia also received significant direct and indirect support from Turkish and Azeri forces. In disputed regions where political and military control changed hands regularly Georgia was not averse to Turkish conquests hoping these would drive out Armenian populations fearful of renewed Turkish slaughter. Once they retook possession of these areas, in an indirect form of ethnic cleansing, they proceeded to erect barriers to returning Armenian refuges thus beginning a hoped for demographic transformation of Lori and Akhalkalak.

The conclusion to the war and the final anti-democratic settlement expressed accurately both the balance of forces and the predatory ambitions of the Georgian elites. Armenia, against its will, against the wishes of the local population and against previously agreed principles of dividing territory according to the democratic wishes of national majorities was forced to concede the larger part of disputed areas.

Though Virapian's account is in many places over-detailed he nevertheless supplies a shocking record of Georgian chauvinist assault on the half million-strong Armenian community within its borders. This
community was treated as a criminal entity, thousands were arrested, their property was confiscated and they were beaten, humiliated, isolated and transformed into pariahs. So the basis was set for the neutralisation and assimilation of Armenian communities in Georgia. During the Soviet era this process continued by other means.

There is in Virapian's account a significant gap. He does not explain why Georgian nationalism proved to be so decisive and why Armenian strategy and tactics so prevaricating, based on wishful thinking and expectations of British or other European assistance. Independence for the Georgian nationalists presented them with the political power with which to take on and defeat their main internal competitor, the Armenian economic class. So brimming with confidence they set out to secure for themselves the lion's share of Caucasian territory that would give them the best geo-political and economic foundations for their state. In contrast, the Armenian elites lacked all these qualities. They had in fact opposed the formation of an independent Armenian state. They preferred instead a confederation of Caucasian nations that would secure them rights to function freely throughout the Caucuses and particularly in Tibilisi and Baku that for them were pastures more profitable than Yerevan. Independence for the Armenian elite was a set back, a hoped for temporary inconvenience to be put right by imperialism. So the Armenian elite floundered while vainly waiting for imperialist charity.

Virabian's book also prompts thought about another important problem of history that today receives little or no attention. In its own way the experience of the Armenian-Georgian war demands consideration of received opinion that the individual nation state is necessarily the most appropriate form for national freedom. In the Caucasus nation-state formation led to repeated wars, to the persistence and even aggravation of wartime miseries, illness, hunger, starvation and to a further dislocation of local economic life. During the Soviet era dominant elites hoping to build homogenous nation-states resorted to quiet ethnic cleansing, national repressions, cultural assimilation and isolation of `foreign communities' that had in fact inhabited the region for centuries. The seeds were sown for yet more hatred and yet more war. In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union new elites exploited old hatreds to wage war for new privileges, war in which once more the common people suffered whilst a tiny minority built mansions. Whether there are alternatives more amenable to harmonious, democratic inter-national coexistence requires further consideration, and here too the Armenian experience offers a rich legacy.

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by Simba Sun Mar 02, 2014 8:01 am

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Georgia President Eduard Shevardnadze, left, congratulates Turkish President Suleyman Demirel after presenting him with the Georgian order of Golden Fleece in Tbilisi, on Friday. Suleyman Demirel arrived in Georgia on Friday for two days of meetings with his Georgia counterpart in a summit expected to focus on Russia's war in Chechnya and a key oil pipeline that would bypass Russia. Sunday, January 16, 2000, AP/PTI

Georgian Ex-President Says Armenia Should Respect Azerbaijan

Eduard Shevarnadze, the Georgian Ex-President, who worked together with Azerbaijan’s All-Nation Leader heydar Aliyev for many years, urges Armenia to respect Azerbaijan, since it is the most powerful state in South Caucasus, Trend reports referring to the National AzTV Channel. According to Mr. Shevarnadze, just owing to the political will of Heydar Aliyev, Azerbaijan has taken the leading position in the region. “ Armenia should respect Azerbaijan, otherwise it may lost its independence. I think that Armenians will realize the necessity to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The delay in this issue may represent even more heavy results than the present-day ones, as Azerbaijan has left behind both Armenia and Georgia by economic, military and defence, and other indicators,” stated Mr. Shevranadze. “Heydar Aliyev was a unique person. He founded the independent state on an empty place. The existing Azerbaijani leader is a wise man too. Heydar Aliyev did not make a mistake when he chose him as his successor,” concluded the Georgian Ex-President.

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by Simba Sun Mar 02, 2014 8:02 am

Georgia for Armenians?

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The word “multinational” is often applied to Georgia, where the number of different nationalities reaches 120 and makes up 18 percent of Georgia’s 5,450,000 population. But trends show that it is becoming more homogeneous; in 1989, 32 percent of the population was non-Georgian. Although their numbers are in decline, Armenians are Georgia’s largest minority, at 8.1 percent. (Russians make 6.3 percent; Azeris, 5.7. Other groups include xxxs and Greeks. Source: World Fact Book.) Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania’s mother is Armenian and many Armenians claim that the Georgian president is in fact Armenian, from a family that had been “Sahakian”, but adopted the “shvili” suffix like many other immigrants. (Saakashvili has not publicly commented on the claim.).

According to official data there are 248,929 Armenians in Georgia. Armenians, however, say that the number reaches 400,000 and that 160,000 live in Javakhk with 120,000 Armenians in Tbilisi. About 50-60,000 are said to live in Abkhazia. Once strong and influential, today Armenians feel unsure about their future in Georgia. In 1991 Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the first president of independent Georgia, sparked separatism toward national minorities in the republic with his “hosts and guests” doctrine. Posters in the country hailed “Georgia for Georgians.” Gamsakhurdia, whose policy mainly concentrated on cleansing the country from “non-Georgians”, was ousted in 1993.

Gamsakhurdia’s presidential term, though short, was significant for the Armenian community. Many left during the period, when they felt the sting of ethnic prejudice and its effect on chances to thrive in a society predisposed against outsiders. More than a decade later, the legacy of discrimination still influences Armenian life in Georgia. The biggest concern Armenians have in Georgia is assimilation. They say the best chance to have success in Georgia is to change the Armenian surname suffix to “shvili” or “dze.” An Armenian student of the State University in Tbilisi says she was told she should change her name before applying for her PhD diploma.

“The truth is that even after succeeding in getting a PhD, there is no chance to get a well-paying job with an Armenian name,” the student says. If Armenians now feel like second-class citizens, it has not always been so. According to an 1821 census, Armenians far outnumbered Georgians in the capital at that time. In Tbilisi, Armenians will show many architectural pearls constructed by prominent Armenian architects of the last centuries. Mansions built by influential Armenians of long ago are among the most attractive buildings in Tbilisi. In the 18th and 19th centuries, rich Armenian merchants, xxxelers and oil industrialists invested heavily in business and helped build cultural centers and schools. Today in “Old Tbilisi”, the Caravanserais, the popular trade centers of the 18th and 19th centuries owned by Armenians are being renovated – turned into modern salons, boutiques, restaurants. And the gentrification is also removing traces of the district’s Armenian past, as signs that once said “Bari Galust” (welcome) are being covered over by new, non-ethnic, facades.

[...]

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by Simba Sun Mar 02, 2014 8:03 am

Armenian Lobby: its Academia and Georgia

Written by Vasili Rukhadze, Tuesday, 29 May 2007

One can write an extensive book about the influence and power of the Armenian lobby in the West and, for that matter, in the world. It is made up of many well established, well connected and very rich ethnic Armenians coming out of a large diaspora, or Spyruk, (roughly 5-6 million) spread throughout the United States, Canada, Russia, France, Great Britain and other European countries. In many cases, these expatriates have lived abroad for generations. Below are a couple recent examples of the lobby’s strength. One example was the Armenian National Committee of America pressuring the US House of Representatives to adopt an amendment in June 2006. The amendment would block US aid to finance the South Caucasus Railway (Baku-Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki-Kars), bypassing Armenia. In October 2006, the US Senate adopted a similar resolution, which forced President Bush to sign, in December 2006, the Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act. The act banned the US Ex-Im (Export-Import) Bank from financing the construction of the Baku-Akhalkalaki-Kars railway.

Another example, in October 2006, occurred when the lower chamber of the French parliament adopted a controversial bill that made a crime to deny that Turks committed genocide against Armenians during World War I in 1915. This law also was pressured by Armenian lobby in France. The goals of the lobby are clear and widely known: to defend the interests of the Armenian state in the Western world and to prepare ground and eventually create a “Historic, Greater Armenia” stretching from Black Sea to Caspian Sea in Caucasus at the expense of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. To this end, a large segment of Armenian academia (both abroad and in Armenia) plays a vital role. It actively influences foreign academia and wider masses about the legacy of Armenian people, its culture and history. It tries to prove the “wretchedness” and “shallowness “of those peoples and cultures in the Caucasus which are perceived as main obstacles on the way of a “Greater Armenia”. This article is just about this issue and it would have never been written if not for the ever-increasing waves of “academic” falsehoods, insults and humiliations packaged as “academic scholarship” by their authors. It is not about one single article, book or a writer. It is about a wider phenomenon, becoming more and more dangerous not only for “victim” cultures and peoples, but for Armenians themselves.

These “academic works” flood scientific conference halls, magazines, newspapers, multitude of websites and bookstores, in USA, Canada, Europe, and Russia. All these publications are of very high polygraphic quality apparently sponsored by rich Armenian diaspora organizations. They quickly and easily find wide audiences, touching spheres as varied as history, geopolitics, ethnography, archeology, linguistics, architecture, different areas of art. Their content varies from being bias to pure absurdity, distorting facts to the point of rewriting whole chapters of history.

In this whole campaign Georgia has been exceptionally heavily targeted by multiple Armenian “scholars”.

It is beyond the scope of this article to mention particular names of hostile Armenian academic works and their authors (it would take multitude of pages anyway). It is not even necessary, because anyone who wishes can check any Armenian authored article, essay, presentation, book or just website about Georgia, published in many foreign languages-they all have one same underlining content: they belittle Georgia, Georgian people, culture and history in order to glorify Armenian one. In these various “works” ancient Georgian language is declared as a branch of Armenian language, actually created by old Armenian scholars. Unique Georgian architectural monuments: churches, castles, medieval palaces, still standing in Georgia, are systematically described as the heritage of Armenian culture (some pathologically radical groups go as far as to secretly remove original stones with Georgian scripts on them from ancient Georgian temples and change them with Armenian ones, to prove buildings’ “authenticity” as Armenian). Multiple samples of historical Georgian music, songs, temple frescos, clothing, dishes, arms, types of martial arts and many others are constantly and unquestionably listed as the products of Armenian culture in the works of various Armenian scholars. Great Georgian kings, statesmen, writers, musicians, poets and philosophers are repeatedly and wrongly announced as ethnic Armenians, in order to glorify the potential of Armenian people while belittling that of Georgian people’s.

All above mentioned efforts of Armenian academia would sound very funny, especially when representatives of other cultures in France, Greece, Ukraine, Egypt and many others complain that their most notable historic figures: statesmen, thinkers, artists are also being declared as ethnic Armenians. But all these are well beyond being merely funny because their works deliver a message of poisonous hatred portraying Georgians as culturally and intellectually inferiors to Armenians. Georgian ethnos continually is being described as an oppressor nation who settled on today’s Georgian lands later than Armenians and other ethnic groups and still is oppressing local population. In their works Georgia is often described as an artificial conglomerate, put together by Georgian “occupiers”. These works are so many that any foreign scholar who seeks to study historical (and modern) Caucasus and Georgia in particular, can’t avoid encountering with these absurd, bias materials. Needless to say, a novice researcher feels immediate contempt against, “oppressor” Georgians, “stealing” cultural heritage and history from Armenian people.

Armenian academia sees Georgia’s Armenian populated region Javakheti as potentially undivided part of a “Greater Armenia”. This latter should include some other parts of Georgia as well, they say, along with Georgian capital Tbilisi that they consider as historically Armenian city (no matter that ethnic Armenians barely make up 4% of the city’s total population). But it is naïve to think that all this academic bias, steadily turning into mass hatred, is only about Javakheti or any other piece of land. It more resembles very well known ethnic hatred, when group of people or whole nation is hated for being just who they are. This overwhelming and unexplainable hatred against particular Georgians or whole Georgian people is spilling over from various books, articles, top or second ranking websites, from ordinary Armenians or academicians, expressing their feelings nakedly or thinly veiled in the dirty rag of “academic scholarship”.

Those few who dared to pick up a pen to denounce all these were insulted, threatened and abused by various secretive and never disclosed affiliates.

It is not entirely clear why Georgia and Georgians deserved such hatred. In its long and turbulent history Georgia many times saved the very existence of Armenian people, helping them with military power or opening its doors to tens of thousands of Armenians to settle within Georgia, when their lives were threatened by mighty and vicious empires in the South. The pages of the history are filled with the fascinating examples of friendship between these two peoples, working and fighting together for survival against common enemies. Did this feeling entirely disappear? Armenian academia decided that it is so.

Unfortunately, Georgian academia has been very passive in responding to these “academic attacks”. How much longer can Georgian academia afford to be idle? It is vital to answer this question because Georgians run a risk that in about 20-30 years they will lose the theoretical-academic ground to claim their Georgian heritage and Georgian culture. The pace of Armenian “academic’ onslaught is very fast. Georgian heritage intensively is being renamed. Georgians do not need to answer the bias with bias, lies with lies and hatred with hatred, but they definitely need to start making the world hear their voice about their academic truth.

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by Simba Sun Mar 02, 2014 8:04 am

Only 4% of Georgians consider Armenia as friendly state

According to the gallup poll in Georgia carried out by “Georgian Consulting Group” organization, Azerbaijan and Ukraine occupy the first places among friends of Georgia.

The list of friendly countries is the following:

1-2. Azerbaijan and Ukraine with 12% each.
3-4. The United States and Estonia with 10% each.
5. Turkey –8%.
6. Germany –6%.
7. Armenia –4%.
8-9. Poland, Kazakhstan with 3% each.
10. Turkmenistan –2%.

(Note: the four percent who had a "friendly" view towards Armenians were most probably Georgians of Armenian decent)

All other countries totally gathered 20 percent of votes of respondents. Totally 50 states were named among friendly nations for Georgia. Only 1 percent of those surveyed considered Russia as a friendly state. 56 percent of respondents placed Russia in the list of unkind countries towards Georgia and 31 percent stated that Georgia does not have enemy-states at all. 13 percent of respondents abstained from giving an answer. Totally 1123 citizens participated in the poll, Gruzia-Online reports.

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by plhr60 Sun Mar 02, 2014 8:08 am

Georgia has so many autonomous regions. We must find a way towards the Black sea through their territoy, but it is too hard, not because we can't win militarily, but because of the USA factor and the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline which they would rigorously defend. But if we find a way through the Black Sea, Armenia's geopolitical imporance will rise dramatically. We will be able to export Iranian oil towards Europe and we will get rid of our heavy reliance on Russia.

by Simba Sun Mar 02, 2014 8:11 am

NAGORNO-KARABAKH IS THE LAND OF AZERBAIJAN AND JEVAHETI OF GEORGIA, BUT NOT ARMENIA: GEORGIAN SCIENTIST

Trend News Agency, Azerbaijan, June 1 2007

Azerbaijan, Baku / corr. Trend S.Agayeva / Doctor of Economic Sciences, Professor of the Academy of Sciences of Georgia, Anzor Totadze, informed Trend that there has been no analogue of such disrespect for a neighboring country, falsification of the history of the people andcrude attempt to appropriate its cultural heritages as is demonstrated in the actions of Armenian pseudo-scientists. According to Totadze, the Armenian academician Suren Ayvazyan and others are the authors of many vulgar falsifications of historical facts.

"According to Ayvazyan, Georgia has been created within the territoryof North Armenia, and Azerbaijan created on the territory of EastArmenia. He tries to prove that by claiming that Bakurakert ( Baku)has been the capital of East Armenia for many years. In addition,he claims that Armenia was created in 2107 BC," Totadze said.

"According to these pseudo-scientists, the whole South Caucasus has been represented by Armenia for millennia and this idea fullycorresponds with the morbid wish of the Armenian scientists. Allfalsifications lead to Armenian terrorist claims towards Jevaheti,"Totadze stressed. The Georgian scientist fully refuted the statementof Armenian scientists by saying that in 1595, 95% of the populationof Jevaheti was settled by the Georgians. According to Totadze, forthe first time, the Armenians who were removed from Turkey appearedthere in autumn of 1829. The historical fact is that in 1829-1831,25,000 Armenians flowed to Samtskhe-Jevaheti. He said that presentlynearly 70,000 Armenians live in Jevaheti and 250,000 in Georgia.

"Nagorno-Karabakh is the territory of Azerbaijan and Jevaheti of Georgia, but not Armenia," Totadze said. The scientist considers the statements of the Armenian scientists to be dangerous and calls on the international community to take measures. He highly assessed the active role of the Human Rights Institute of the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences in this process. One of the activity directionsof the Institute headed by Rovshan Mustafayev is to discover Armenianchauvinism which presents a real threat to the South Caucasus.

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by Simba Sun Mar 02, 2014 8:12 am

Armenia plans to occupy Abkhazia? Georgian intelligentsia accuses Armenians of genocide of Georgians

APA news agency (Baku) reports that 60 representatives of the Georgian intelligentsia have demanded that Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili recognize the genocide committed by Armenians in Georgia.

They say that in 1993, the “Bagramyan” military unit, together with Abkhazians, fought against the Georgian army and killed Georgians living in Abkhazia: “Before the Czar, Russia populated Georgian Javakheti with Armenians, there had been no single Armenian in that region. However, today Javakheti is mentioned as part of Armenia. Having ‘crippled’ the Georgian monuments in the territory of Javakheti, the Armenians are not trying to convince everybody that they are Armenian. All this is being done systematically, and so, must be recognized as a genocide against the Georgian nation.”

Member of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia in exile Akaky Gasviani supports this initiative and points out that the Armenians have a big role in the “occupation” of Georgian lands and the establishment of the separatist regime in Abkhazia. The Golos Armenii daily publishes the abridged version of the article “What Is Armenia Plotting Against Georgia,” published in the Aisi daily (Georgia) (#36, Oct 3-9 2006). Golos Armenii says that the article tells how Armenians populated Abkhazia and Ajaria and what the atrocities the “Bagramyan” battalion committed during the war against the Georgians. "Journalist Gogneli quotes “some expert on Armenian problems” as saying:

“If anybody thinks that the Russians will appropriate Abkhazia, he is mistaken. Should they – God forbid — recognize Abkhazia as an independent, the Armenians will occupy this region in just one year. Today, they are silent and are just waiting for a good opportunity. But as soon as it happens, they will rise and appropriate this Georgian region. Today, they are trying to occupy Abkhazia’s sea coast — they are actively working in this direction. Then, they will ‘take care of’ Javakheti” and, finally, they will get access to the sea. This is a part of their “Great Armenia” plan. So, we, the Georgians, must be vigilant and wise. I wonder if our leadership is thinking about it?"

The Azg daily says that, neither in the Georgian mass media nor via its own sources in Georgia, has it managed to find anything that could prove the information of the Georgian daily. Asked by Azg to comment on the statement, Ambassador of Georgia to Armenia Revaz Gachechiladze said that he knows nothing about such a statement and, even if it was made, he, first of all, wants to know the names of its authors. “In any case, this is not the position of the Georgian Government.”

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by Simba Sun Mar 02, 2014 8:13 am

Historic Concern: Georgian Armenians say authorities out to rid country of Armenian traces

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By Aris Ghazinyan, ArmeniaNow Reporter

AKHALTSKHA, GEORGIA – A once powerful Armenian ethno-cultural layer in Georgia is currently facing destruction. This at least is the conclusion of representatives of Armenian public organizations operating in the territory of Georgia’s Samtskhe-Javakhetia (Javakhk) province. In their opinion, the eradication of the Armenian element has been elevated by official Tbilisi into state policy and it is being effectively carried out especially in the area of Armenian architecture.

“The process of turning the Armenian monuments of medieval architecture into Georgian ones, has sense only in the context of the common policy of Georgian authorities,” Ludwig Petrosyan, chairman of the Armenian National Public Union (ANPU) told ArmeniaNow. “In this connection it is no wonder that this policy is being initially tested in the provincial center of Akhaltskha,” a traditionally Armenian province.

In 1829, Russian general Paskevich occupied Akhaltskha and annexed it to the Russian Empire. The same general, in 1830, carried out the resettlement of 2,536 Armenian families from Armenian Karin (Erzrum) to Akhaltskha, which then was situated only on the left bank of the tributary of the Kura – Potskhov. The Armenian population that settled down on the right bank of the river expressed their desire to call that region “New Erzrum”, but the general did not give his consent, saying that the right bank of the Potskhov, in accordance with the resettlement plan, would bear the name of “Plan”. At present, this region of Akhaltskha is known under the name of “Mard”. At least since the 10th century the opposite bank has borne the Arabic name of “Rabat”. It became the nucleus of the town’s establishment.

“Basing on this very fact the authorities of official Tbilisi are trying to prove to the world that up to the first half of the 19th century there was no Armenian town-forming factor in Akhaltskha,” says the head of the ANPU legal department Samson Abrahamyan. “Thereby the Georgian leadership totally ignores the ancient and medieval history of the land and is trying to overlook the presence of numerous traces of Armenian culture – including churches and cemeteries in the town’s left bank dated to an earlier period.

That’s why the traces of Armenian life preserved there are either being destroyed or portrayed as Georgian. And this policy often acquires comic manifestations: in particular, the exclusively Armenian tombstones – khachkars (stone crosses) are presented as Georgian gravestones by way of putting Georgian inscriptions on them. The same inscriptions can be met today also on the facades of Armenian buildings in Rabat. The Surb Astvatsatsin (St. Virgin) Church, for example, dates back to 1356. Founded in the 12th-13th centuries the Surb Yeremyan Church originally was an Armenian Apostolic and later Armenian Catholic Church. It is remarkable that the country’s authorities are thus trying to present even the Catholic buildings as Georgian, although Georgians have never been Catholics. They were Muslims, but not Catholics.”

This region of Georgia, as in the north-western region of Armenia, is a center of Armenian Catholicism. The majority of the Christian population here are Catholics, and it is from among them that one of the prominent figures of the Roman Catholic Church, Cardinal G. P. Aghajanyan came.

“The Armenians of Akhaltskha constituted the core of trade-merchant and manufacturing urban estates, they had their workshops and were engaged in medicine and education,” Hrant Karapetyan, the head of the youth union of scouts, said in an ArmeniaNow interview. “In 1876 the population was 13,300, and in 1900 it was 16,116, and the Armenian population made 13,000. There were Armenian periodicals in the town as well as numerous schools. There were five Armenian churches, and among them the famous educational complex at the Surb Nshan Cathedral, which is today presented by Georgian authorities as a monument of Georgian architecture. Besides Armenian churches there was also a mosque and two synagogues in the town.”

The old xxxish cemetery of Akhaltskha was situated on the left bank next to the Armenian cemetery. Despite the fact that there are practically no xxxs left in town, the cemetery itself is surrounded by a high stone fence and is under protection.

“The same cannot be said about the old Armenian cemetery,” says Ludwig Petrosyan. He himself is an Akhaltskha native, whose ancestors lived here long before the resettlement of 1830.

“The uniqueness and value of this cemetery consists in the fact that along with early Christian buildings it is a material proof of the permanent presence of Armenians in the town,” he says. “It is an old necropolis where residents of Akhaltskha were buried even before the 19th century. That’s why this cemetery is not properly protected by the state. Of course, much depends on us, however in the current conditions we are practically deprived of many possibilities.”

A monument to the victims of the Armenian Genocide in Turkey was erected in one of the hills near the town last year upon Petrosyan’s initiative. The only such monument in the territory of Georgia is a traditional Armenian khachkar. It was set up on the threshold of the saddest day in Armenian history – April 24. The project had been coordinated with municipal authorities.

“However, it was dismantled by officers of the law, on orders by provincial authorities, and I was summoned to the Prosecutor’s Office,” remembers the ANPU chairman. It was only after a row threatening to strain Armenian-Georgian state relations that the monument was restored, by the intervention of Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili.

“The provincial leadership did not allow us to fence the khachkar and build a dozen steps leading up to it on the 90th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide,” says Petrosyan. “What larger project can we speak about in such conditions? It is enough to mention that against the background of numerous idling and decaying Armenian architectural constructions framing the hollow of Akhaltskha, the only functioning church is literarily driven into the former synagogue and then into the mosque situated in the xxxish district.”

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by Simba Sun Mar 02, 2014 8:14 am

Turkish Investments in Georgia and Azerbaijan: Recent Trends and Future Prospects

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Turkish Prime Minister Tayyib Erdogan, Georgian PresidentMikhail Saakashvili and Azeri President Ilham Aliyev cuta red ribbon during the opening of the new internationalairport in Tbilisi February 7, 2007.

What are the recent trends regarding Turkish investments in Georgia and Azerbaijan? Does geographical and cultural proximity present a particular advantage for Turkish investors? Recent figures show that Turkey has the firm intention to assert itself as a serious investor in the Caucasus with the aim of diversifying its investments in sectors other than energy. Turkey is Georgia’s second largest trade partner. Turkish exports, 27% of Georgia’s total imports, increased from $68 million in 1995 to $131 million in 2000. Nutritional products constitute a majority of Turkish exports to Georgia while automobile spare parts, machinery, and furniture follow; it seems there has not been many changes in the composition of export items. Russia became Georgia’s second trade partner after the Russian crisis in 1998 and cheap and large quantities of Russian products to Georgia decreased the competitiveness of Turkish exports. With regard to direct investments, the National Bank of Georgia indicated that Turkish foreign investment stock between 1997 and 2005 reached $175 million.

However, Turkish investments are not the leading ones in Georgia; American and British foreign investments are the two important foreign investment sources with their volumes being far higher than those of Turkey. It seems that Turkey cannot exploit its geographical advantage perfectly. In 2004, Turkish direct investments reached $30 million, which was 23% of total foreign investments in Georgia. A majority of these investments went to telecommunication, manufacturing, harbor management, glass packaging, and water bottling sectors. Turkish investments are limited in the construction sector with Turkish contractors having recent contracts amounting $88 million.

Latest trade negotiations, which included such issues as customs, direct investment, taxation, technical collaboration, and commercial conflicts, however, are promising; Turkey is planning to invest $5 billion in Georgia in the form of direct investment, exports, imports, and project funding. Turkey is interested in especially energy, agriculture, and construction fields on which it has national expertise. Important Turkish and Turkish-affiliated firms in Georgia are Mina Joint Stock Company, Geocell, Sener Arda Group, Delta Petroleum Company, and construction companies of Baytur, Borova, Burc, Ustay, and Zafer.

In sum, similar to other CIS countries, foreign investment in Georgia is targeted at extracting and transporting natural resources and privatizing some state-owned enterprises. The largest foreign investments were made in 2003-2004, and mostly attributable to the construction of the Baku-Supsa and Baku-Ceyhan oil pipelines. However, these areas do not contribute much to national production, employment, and economic activity. Foreign investments towards other areas especially manufacturing sector would more increase economic activity, offer employment opportunities, and stimulate other sectors.

Proximity between Turkey and Azerbaijan

Turkey’s trade and investment ties with Azerbaijan are closer than those with other Caucasian countries. Turkey is among the leading investors in Azerbaijan with an $8.7 billion of investment volume and a 15% economic share. Turkey is the third largest source of Azeri imports after the U.S. and U.K. Whereas other leading investment countries generally engage in petroleum-related investments, Turkey’s investments are focusing on other sectors as well. So far, 1,267 Turkish firms have been registered in Azerbaijan; but currently half of these firms are active. Between 1994 and 1999, Turkey’s share in direct investment, similar to that of the U.K., in Azerbaijan was 15% (ranked second) whereas the economic share of the U.S. was 28%. As of 2005, Turkey’s share in direct investment in Azerbaijan increased to 36% with a volume of $1.5 billion out of total $4.1 billion.

Turkish firms today are operating in many sectors in Azerbaijan like oil, telecommunication, food, banking, insurance, construction, textile, automobile, transportation, chemicals, iron, steel, energy, education, media, marketing, and bakeries. This high diversity of investments stimulates economic activity by creating employment, transferring know-how, and modernizing the industries. Some important Turkish investment firms are Turkish National Petroleum Company, Turkcell (GSM sector), Azersun (various sectors), Anadolu Holding (beverage sector), Koc Holding (retailer, automobile, banking), Teletas (communication), and contracting firms of Atilla Dogan, Borova, Ekpar, Enka, Tekfen, Tepe, Yucelen, and Zafer. However, recent trends show that contracting firms’ share is decreasing due to economic and political instability.

In conclusion, Turkey has national advantages and expertise in construction, textile, tourism, and agriculture sectors, and is relatively good in the service sector (banking and finance, exporting, marketing, and real estate) as well. Analyzing export and direct investment items, we see that Turkey cannot exploit its national advantages well in Georgia but can in Azerbaijan; Georgia cannot benefit from its close proximity to these resources. For example, when we consider Turkey’s expertise in the construction sector both in the domestic and foreign markets, it is interesting to see such a low Turkish foreign investment volume in the Georgia.

In a recent speech, Turkish Foreign Trade Minister Mr. Kursad Tuzmen declared that Turkey is willing to increase its investment volume in the construction sector in Georgia to $350 million. Future business prospects between Georgia and Turkey would be as follows: Turkey, having a large agriculture sector, can use this knowledge in the Georgian agriculture sector especially in areas like processing, packaging, and exporting agricultural products and Georgia can improve. The textile industry, Turkey’s key competitive sector, can also play an important role in the development of Georgian textiles and the leather sector. In addition, there is a potential for joint production related to small-sized vehicles such as trucks and minibuses. Regarding the service sector, Roman Gotsiridze, president of the National Bank, indicated future prospects that Turkish investments can improve in Georgia, such as banking, telecommunication, and tourism.

Turkey, however, is effectively exploiting its competitive advantages, thanks to geographical and cultural proximity, in Azerbaijan as evidenced by its leading position in non-petroleum sectors. Azerbaijan’s efforts in renovating its industries depend in part on learning from foreign investors through collaboration and transferring know-how. When we think of the leading position of Turkish investments in areas other than oil, Azeri firms can learn from and collaborate with modern and sophisticated Turkish firms. In exchange, Turkish firms can get further business opportunities in the Azeri market. In this regard, Turkish firms have some advantages compared to their rivals especially from Russia and Iran. Turkey has cultural proximity, market knowledge and experience in Azerbaijan.

Turkey is more experienced than Russia and Iran in the construction, textile, food, telecommunication, banking, and agriculture sectors. These advantages, if used correctly and ethically, can open further doors to Turkish firms in the Azeri markets. One caveat is that some Turkish firms are infamous for their bad quality and unethical business behaviors. This may hurt the Turkish image and may lead to an overall negative perception towards Turkish firms both in Azeri and other surrounding markets.

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by Simba Sun Mar 02, 2014 8:16 am

Russia’s Geopolitical Counter-Offensive in the Former Soviet Union

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In the last two to three years Russia has been on a geopolitical offensive in the countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. It has been gradually regaining the ground lost in the aftermath of the American invasion of Afghanistan and the Georgian, Ukrainian and Kyrgyz revolutions. Central Asia. The first major victory for Russia came in Tajikistan in 2004. The country was drifting towards the West following the ouster of the Taliban from neighboring Afghanistan. Moscow worked vigorously to bring the nation back under its sway. The Kremlin repeatedly threatened the Tajik government of Imomali Rakhmonov with the expulsion of one million Tajik workers from Russia, while offering debt relief for the return to Moscow’s orbit. In October of 2004 Russian President Putin and Tajik leader Rakhmonov signed an agreement. Russia agreed to let Tajik laborers remain in Russia and forgave the country $240 million of its $300 million debt.

[...]

The South Caucasus

Russia has been equally aggressive on its southern flank in the Caucasus. Moscow managed to further increase its already overwhelming influence in Armenia. It upgraded the Russian military base in Giumry, in the northern part of the country and successfully completed the process of acquiring Armenia’s power distribution network in September 2006. The Russian energy monopoly RAO UES already owns most of Armenian hydroelectric plants and manages the finances of the nuclear power station in Metsamor. In addition, the Kremlin controlled Gasprom is Armenia’s single gas provider. Russian gas generates 40% of Armenia’s electricity, another 40% coming from Russian controlled Metsamor. Gasprom also owns the country’s biggest thermal plant. In November 2006 the giant Russian mobile phone operator Vimpel-Communications bought 90% of the shares in Armenia’s national telecommunications company, ArmenTel, from the Greek firm OTE.

In April 2007 Moscow announced joint uranium excavation venture of Armenia’s uranium reserves, which is scheduled to begin later in this year. Yerevan also agreed to join the International Uranium Enrichment Center, located in Irkutsk region of Russia. Some Armenian experts express their deep concern over Moscow’s suffocating influence in all spheres of the country’s life. However, this doesn’t change the overall picture. The nation remains bound to Moscow to such degree that it leaves even President Putin satisfied. During one of his meetings with Armenian President Robert Kocharian (in February 2007, after the Russian takeover of the Armenian power grid) he half happily and half ironically declared that “there is no issue which can not be solved between Armenia and Russia”. The Kremlin kept Yerevan under close watch to make sure that the piping of the new Iranian-Armenian gas pipeline (that opened in March 2007, transporting gas into Armenia) was small in diameter. Thus Moscow prevented Iran and Armenia from exporting gas to other countries and avoided international competition with Russian Gasprom.

In contrast to Armenia, neighboring Azerbaijan drifted away from Russia and closer to the United States and NATO alliance. In 2006 Moscow attacked Azerbaijan, threatening to increase gas prices twofold. Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev defied the Kremlin and on his part threatened to stop the export of gas from Russia to Azerbaijan and the import of oil from Azerbaijan to Russia. In 2005 the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline became operational, transporting Azerbaijani oil via Georgia and Turkey to the West. In 2006 the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum pipeline went into operation. It significantly increased the political weight and strategic importance of Azerbaijan, brought it closer to the West and reduced Russian influence in the South Caucasus. Nevertheless, Moscow effectively kept the Karabakh conflict frozen, with a large portion of Baku’s political and diplomatic resources chained to the issue. The Kremlin also succeeded in maintaining its lease on an anti-Missile radar facility in the northern Azerbaijani city of Gabala. Realizing Azerbaijan’s huge importance as an energy rich country, with a highly geostrategic location in Caucasus and in the Caspian basin, the Kremlin doesn’t (and will not) spare its efforts to bring Baku back under Moscow’s influence. So there will be ever increasing pressure applied from Moscow towards Azerbaijan in the coming months or even years, if necessary.

Pro-Western Georgia has been the Kremlin’s main target in southern Caucasus. Russia fully realizes the huge significance of Georgia. If it regains influence over the country Moscow kills two birds with one stone: it gets direct land access to its satellite Armenia and neutralizes increasingly anti-Russian Azerbaijan, which heavily relies on Georgia to transport its abundant gas and oil resources to the West. Moscow has been doing everything it can to bend Georgia and Mikhail Saakashvili’s pro-Western government to its will. Russia heightened tensions in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the Armenian populated Javakheti region in southern Georgia; sponsored and organized pro-Russian political groups to create social protests and undermine the government; supported anti-government armed revolt of Georgian warlord Emzar Kvitsiani in western Georgia; banned Georgian wines and mineral waters from Russian markets; raised gas price threefold; cut off all air and land connections with the country and deported hundreds of Georgian immigrants from Russia.

However, Saakashvili turned out to be a hard stone for Moscow to break. He managed to accelerate significant political, economic and military reforms in the country. He brought Georgia even closer to the West and to its goal of integration in NATO and eventually into the European Union. Saakashvili’s administration, with Western support, succeeded in starting the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia. The Russian Army will leave the country entirely by the end of 2008. The opening of Baku-Batumi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (in 2005) and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum gas pipeline (in 2006) strengthened Georgia’s national security and regional and international position. However, besides many successes achieved in the nation-building process in the last several years, Georgia’s future is not entirely certain. Moscow doesn’t seem ready to retreat: it is lobbying hard in European capitals (using its energy clout) against NATO membership for Georgia, simultaneously subjecting the nation to almost daily, heavy political and economic blackmail.

Western Frontline

Russia has been similarly aggressive on its geopolitical frontline in post-Soviet Europe. After the humiliation of the Ukraine’s 2004 presidential elections, Moscow worked hard to contain and reverse the Orange Revolution. First, in winter of 2005 Russia heavily hit the country by doubling natural gas prices (gas raw that caused a disruption of gas supplies to Europe). Then, the well-organized and well financed Ukraine’s pro-Russian “Party of Regions” based on Russian speaking voters in the country’s east, gained a vital 33% in Ukraine’s March 2006 parliamentary elections. The formerly disgraced Victor Yanukovich (the leader of the “Party of Regions” and the loser of disputed 2004 presidential elections) was catapulted into the position of Prime-Minister. Since then, he effectively halted the country’s integration process into NATO. Profound disagreements between President Yushenko’s and his pro-Russian Prime-Minister’s policies’ resulted in the dissolution of the Ukrainian parliament in April 2007 and plunged the country into a deep political crisis, that continues to be filled with uncertainty. In addition, by issuing clear threats to the territorial integrity of the Ukraine, Russia’s Ministry of Defense succeeded in maintaining its naval military facilities on the Black Sea coast.

[...]

Conclusion

Russia lost a great deal of influence in 1990’s and then in the first years of the new millennia, following the American invasion of Afghanistan and Georgian and Ukrainian revolutions in countries of the former Soviet Union. However, Putin’s Russia never gave up its hegemonic aspirations. But Moscow also realized that economically week Russia, with a disastrous war still going in Chechnya, couldn’t afford an ambitious foreign policy. Putin’s Russia rose quietly and gradually. After the September 11 attacks, Putin agreed to let Americans establish military bases in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. In fact Russia could do very little to stop Washington at that time. However, in exchange Russia got a free hand in Chechnya. By 2004-2005 Moscow basically crushed the Chechen rebellion killing the main Chechen field commanders. At the same time the Kremlin consolidated Russia’s entire energy sector in the state’s hands, sending disobedient oligarchs to jails or exile. Moscow gradually acquired about 30%-40% of Europe’s energy markets and unfolded a large scale geopolitical counter-offensive in the countries of the former Soviet Union.

Russia’s tactics were basically the same against post-Soviet states: Moscow allies with semi-authoritarian, corrupt, stagnant and isolated regimes (Uzbekistan, Belarus, Tajikistan) guaranteeing their survival in exchange for their obedience to Moscow. Under the banner of keeping stability in a country and in a wider region Russia poses as a policeman, supporting regimes militarily in case of domestic turbulence. Then Russia establishes (or expands already existing) military presence in a country, tightly chaining a nation’s military complex to its own (Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan). Simultaneously Russian state monopolies move in on a country, establishing their dominance on a nation’s energy resources (Turkmenistan), energy infrastructure (Armenia, Tajikistan) and their transportation routes (Kazakhstan). In the beginning, the Kremlin backed Russian companies promise many investments, not only in energy sector but also in other sectors of economy, such as telecom, tourism, transportation. However, Moscow never invests enough (or any) capital to make meaningful change. It merely chains local economies to its own, guarantees its dominance, prevents international economic competition and leaves local societies frustrated and impoverished (Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Belarus, Armenia).

Against pro-Western post-Soviet countries Russia deploys various tactics: supports shady separatist regimes (against Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan); cuts off gas supplies and astronomically raises prices (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan); applies economic sanctions (Moldova, Georgia); manipulates elections in cooperation with local corrupt and criminal elites (Ukraine); detonates local pro-Russian or Russian forces (Georgia, Ukraine, Estonia). Today Russia is not the world’s strongest country, but it definitely is the strongest power in the former Soviet Union. It had some setbacks and failures in the last few years but overall Moscow is in a much stronger position than it was 4-5 years ago. The Kremlin’s geopolitical successes were contributed to by the instability in the Middle East, high energy prices, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and not enough activity from the European Union in the nations of the former Soviet Union. Today Russia represents the single biggest threat to the national sovereignty and security of post-Soviet states. Moscow’s goal is not a mere dominance in the region. Russian strategic planners and policy makers have made it amply clear that the Kremlin wants to bring the whole former Soviet landmass under the Russian dominated “Eurasian Union”. Moscow’s new KGB run regime has political will, determination and aggressiveness to do just that. As long as America continues to be bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan and Europe shows timidity in confronting new Russian neo-imperialism, the Kremlin will find it less and less difficult to achieve its goals. Undoubtedly, there are very hard days ahead of those former Soviet countries which really care for their freedom and future.

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by Simba Sun Mar 02, 2014 8:16 am

Heidar Aliev statue opening in Tbilisi

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HEIDAR ALIEV'S BUST IN RUSTAVI (GEORGIA)

Ilham Aliev a president of Azerbaijan arrived in Tbilisi with Mikheil Saakashvili to attend an opening of the statue of Heidar Aliev. Presidents arrived from Poland. They have opened a statue in Abanotubani and assessed this fact as an example of friendship of two countries. Author of the statue is Azerbaijanian sculptor. The municipal council of Rustavi, province of Kvemo Kartli, Georgia, decided to immortalize Heidar Aliev's ("the national leader of Azerbajan") name, renaming Gagarin Square Heidar Aliev Square. They anticipate putting also the bust of Aliev.

By Aghavni Harutyunian

by Simba Sun Mar 02, 2014 8:18 am

KARABAKH CONFLICT HANGS OVER GEORGIA'S ARMENIAN-POPULATED REGIONS

By Zaal Anjaparidze, Wednesday, March 15, 2006

Tensions are running high in Tsalka and Akhalkalaki, two regions of Georgia that are predominantly populated by ethnic Armenians. The latest problem began in Tsalka on March 9, when a trivial brawl at a restaurant between local Armenians and Georgians resulted in the death of Gevork Gevorkian, a 24-year-old Armenian, and injuries to four other Armenians. However, Maria Mikoyan of the Armenian Union in Georgia (Nor Serund) claimed that the fight began because the Georgian young men were irritated by the Armenian music playing in the restaurant.

Although police have arrested five Georgian suspects, about 500 Armenian protesters gathered outside the Tsalka administrative building on March 10, calling for prosecution of the suspects. On March 11, the upheaval spread to Akhalkalaki, a town in the predominately Armenian populated Samtskhe-Javakheti region in southern Georgia.

About 300 participants in the Akhalkalaki rally were Tsalka Armenians. They later took their appeal to the Georgian government and demanded that Tbilisi "stop the policy of pressure by fueling interethnic tensions" and "stop the settlement of other nationalities in Armenian-populated regions." Later, the protesters voiced demands related to the right to conduct court proceedings and government business in the Armenian language. Specifically, they want the central government to make the Armenian language a state language equal to Georgian in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region. Reiterating the alleged threat to the rights of Armenians in Georgia, the appeal also demanded political autonomy for the region.

The rally soon turned violent. The protesters, mostly youth, left the government building and raided a local court chamber, ousting a Georgian judge. They also attacked a building on Tbilisi State University's Akhalkalaki campus and a local Georgian Orthodox Church. Later on Khachatur Stepanian, a representative of the council of Armenian civic groups in Samtskhe-Javakheti, which organized the rally, attempted to soften the anxiety and called the incident a "provocation" staged by "someone else."

On March 11, leaders of the public movement Multiethnic Georgia and the Armenian Union in Georgia complained that police had brutally dispersed the rally in Tsalka where "ethnic confrontation is increasingly becoming a reason behind crimes." They said that if tension in Tsalka and Samtskhe-Javakheti continues, then Tbilisi would be forced to establish direct presidential rule there.

Although Georgian Public Defender Sozar Subari investigated the Tsalka incident and ruled it to be a "communal crime," the majority of the Armenian communities in these regions consider the incident to be a demonstration of ethnic hatred towards Armenians, which they believe is the result of the Georgian government's misguided policies towards ethnic minorities. They further alleged that Georgian law-enforcement agents were working in tandem with those who committed the crime.

United Javakh, a radical Armenian organization in Samtskhe-Javakheti, issued a statement accusing Tbilisi of "discriminatory policies" against "the Armenian population of Javakh," the Armenian nomenclature for the region. They described the recent dismissal of the region's ethnic Armenian judges for ignorance of the Georgian language as "cynically xxxxxling on the rights of the Armenian-populated region." Georgian authorities insist the judges were dismissed for misconduct.

The United Javakh statement warned about "destructive trends in the Georgian government's policy" aimed at artificially creating a "climate of ethnic intolerance" and "crushing the will of Javakh's Armenian population to protect its right to live in its motherland." Finally the statement demands that Tbilisi show "political prudence" and put an end to the "infringement" of the Armenian community's rights.

The content and tone of this and previous statements by United Javakh and other radical Armenian organizations reportedly have strong backing from political forces in Armenia. In fact, the statements recall the language used by the Armenian community in Karabakh in its relations with the Azerbaijani government before war erupted. Vardan Akopian, chair of the Javakh Youth organization, argued, "The current situation in Javakheti is a cross between situations in Nakhichevan and Karabakh." Several protestors explicitly cited the Karabakh precedent.

Symptomatically, on October 8, 2005, Garnik Isagulyan, the Armenian president's national security advisor, bluntly warned Tbilisi to be "extremely cautious" with regard to Samtskhe-Javakheti "because any minor provocation can turn into a large-scale clash" (EDM, October 12, 2005). Various Armenian political parties, officials, and media have actively discussed the problems of the Armenian community in Samtskhe-Javakheti. Some Armenian members of the Georgian parliament linked this activity with the approaching parliamentary elections in Armenia.

Recently Armenian Defense Minister Serge Sarkisian released a paper on security issues in which he expressed concern over the situation in Samtskhe-Javakheti. The excessively critical tone of the Armenian minister towards Tbilisi's policy in Samtskhe-Javakheti reportedly alarmed Georgian politicians and analysts, but they preferred to stay tight-lipped, perhaps to avoid upsetting the already-complex Georgian-Armenian relationship (EDM, August 3, June 7, May 24, March 23, 2005). Russia has tried to capitalize on the problem by fueling tensions in Akhalkalaki, location of a Russian military base slated for closure.

Although the Georgian government is continuously downplaying the ethnic aspects of the disturbances in Armenian-populated regions, this factor appears to lurk beneath the surface. Georgia remains Armenia's sole transport route to Russia and Europe due to the ongoing blockade by Turkey and Azerbaijan. Thus an unstable Samtskhe-Javakheti would hardly be a gain for Yerevan. However, the "Karabakh syndrome" should not be removed from the agenda.

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